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Abstract 
By defining choice, we consider it as a commonly accepted way of either avoiding or reducing the uncertainty.  How we perceive 
our actions is the result of the joint acceptance and while preferences become the results of cultural and moral constraints, we seek 
for rational explanatory framework for our choices. Our pursuits of welfare are therefore conditioned and bounded by external 
values which we accept and threat as ours. What is rational is therefore and ambiguous concept. 
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 1. Introduction 
The growing number of research in the field of economics and culture gives rise to the new model of rational-man. 
While on the contrary to the neoclassical economics, both new institutional economics and behavioral economics 
create the base for better understanding of human nature and therefore aim to explain diversity of economic outcomes. 
Interactions between individuals are driven by scarcity of goods and beliefs on what defines their equilibrium. By 
recognizing the most probable and influential elements of culture, we are able to trace economic and social disparities. 
Therefore we understand culture as a set of common beliefs which constitute society’s institutional environment (Greif 
1994). In this framework any repeated transaction should already have an expected outcome. To lessen disparities in 
any given society, Nash equilibrium have to be repeatedly sustained.  
The article proceeds as follows: the second part reviews related literature. Previous contributions on the role of 
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informal determinants of economic development are determined and trends in research on culture and economics are 
briefly presented. The third part emphasizes the correlation between personal beliefs and income per-capita as a 
measure of a well-being. Part four presents the idea of moral constraints and the complex decision making process. 
 
1. Theoretical and empirical contribution regarding the concept of rational man 
The literature concerning the concept of rational man has its main source in the neoclassical economics. Name of 
the mainstream proposed by Thorstein Veblen, who is identified with the rise of institutional economics, was 
consciously established to describe a homogenous economic thought. This commonly accepted way of thinking 
restrained any incentive from a vascular research on sources of economic outcomes. However any theory concerned 
on profit-maximizing has to be grounded in the individual’s behavior. I argue that both neoclassical economics and 
new institutional economics could be used in explaining how rationality or its lack influences economic development 
of a country.  
I follow Popper (1965) who characterizes actions as a result of logic interpretation. Therefore the total utility is the 
sum of personal aspirations and social acceptance, where both are determined by the institutional framework. Hence 
the utility function is diversified among individuals and could be a subject of a change under different institutions. 
These institutions are widely divided into formal and informal, whereas informal are defined as “values, morals, 
conventions, norms, habits, traditions, codes of conduct, attitudes and beliefs” (Dobler, 2009) and formal as: “political 
(and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts” (North, 1990). In the literature concerning the institutional 
framework, we can find two basic research approaches. Assuming the division of institutional framework the informal 
constraints derive from a need to limit the uncertainty in dealing with other people. While we strive for predictable 
outcomes, we lower transaction costs by moral indications. By conventions and habits transmitted from parents and 
trough social interactions, we rely on others, believing they apply similar codes of conduct. In terms of formal 
institutions, we behave accordingly to constitutional rules which are enforced by the government. However “it is the 
habitual character of the behavior which we call an institution upon which we rely in inferring that behavior will 
continue, i.e., that the legal institution is permanent of relatively so” (Underhill Morre, 1923). Hence a set of legal 
institutions derives from the logical and rational behavior of the individual and therefore a collective. Habits, customs 
and common interpretation of socio-economic events shape the institutional framework.  
While the idea of rational man was a result of neoclassical economic thought, the opposite concept was born in the 
theory of organizations (Simon, 1947). The bounded rationality implies that an individual is both goal-oriented and 
aware of the appearing limitations. Any decision is a result of the personalized utility function, as well as belief that 
information obtained is either full or sufficient to make the best choice. In the field of political science, in regards to 
the work of Simon, the single achievement which was partially a “satisfying” result of his research was a statement 
on the restraints of cognitive abilities. One cannot structure any set of behavioral responses, because of the 
“complexity of the environment in which it operates” (Jones, 1999). Hereby uncertainty consists of habits, routines, 
social expectations and codes of conduct. I assume uncertainty as result of ambiguous environment where any choice 
is an attempt to minimize opportunity costs. By limited cognition people strive to avoid complex situations, which 
demand to penetrate the problem (Lindblom, 1959). On the contrary people seek for social approval and routinized 
standards of behavior. Obviously this is a transmission from the organization theory, where any rules are evolutionary 
and structured (March & Simon, 1958). Learning is a process of adjusting into an existing structure. Educational span 
is therefore limited, the capability to make decisions disrupted and subjective, while rationality is the best fit to the 
institutional framework. I follow Jones (2001) to claim the “mismatch between our inherited cognitive architectures 
and the tasks we face today”. Whereas neoclassical economics perceives behavior to be predicted and based on cost 
calculation, by taking into consideration the utility theory is still valid we assume the hypothesis the only version of 
explaining rationality. This ordinal utility theory is however based on the idea of maximization, which is unable to 
explain the process of decision making (Keita, 1992). On the other hand the concept of moral constraints known under 
the expected utility theory seeks to explain the outcomes by considering risk aversion, probability of occurrence and 
personalized utility from the same payout (Bernoulli, 1954). This theory embraces the nature of decision making 
process with the usage of mathematical expectations. What is apparent here is, to incorporate a model which assumes 
choices made under risk and therefore account for risk aversion. To define rational decision maker I lean towards the 
common acceptance for four axioms proposed by Neumann and Morgenstern (Bloomfield, 1976). By completeness, 
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transitivity, independence and continuity I assume the model of maximal rationality, although I find it based on the 
probability.  
Human behavior is embedded in the institutional framework which consists of both scarcity and uncertainty. It is 
comprised in the socially accepted code of conduct (Granovetter, 1985). Assuming people to be goal-oriented, we 
would insist that human behavior is predictable. Therefore actions and outcomes are a subject of logical deduction. 
However the opposite is reasonable - preferences over outcomes and behavior flexibility under different circumstances 
(Donahoe, 2009). By accepting the inversion we are able to seek for cultural (and more behavioral) explanation of 
moral constraints which determine our choices.  
 
2. Correlation between personal beliefs and well-being 
How bounded rationality influences well-being of an individual is a subject of a research in the fields of behavior 
economics and new institutional economics. While certain models of physical adjustments are called institutions, the 
ability to make rational choices is a matter of reversing the common understanding of constraints, as known in the 
new institutional economics. To reverse the understanding of constraints into potentially helpful ideas is to define 
them as the evolutionary designed moral guidelines, enabling us to reduce uncertainty in dealing with other people. 
Tracing back the origins of those moral codes of conduct, I follow Menger who referred to “organic evolution of social 
convention” (Schotter, 1986). In that sense institutions, and thus moral codes of conduct, are found to be 
complementary to the conception of the invisible hand of the market. Spontaneous order and expected behavior are 
apparently the opposite concepts of rational man. By spontaneous order I define decisions undertaken without a 
conscious approach of a self-interested individual, whereas the same decisions become foundations of collective social 
order (Hayek, 1973). Decisions made under specific institutional framework, where certain values are either shared 
and accepted or denied and condemned enhance certain attitudes. The expected behavior is a result of common attitude 
shaped by cultural elements which are often transmitted non-verbally and therefore cannot be changed fortnightly.  
However the notion of maximizing own utility function is an attractive idea, it does not sufficiently explain motives 
and actions of individuals and collective under different circumstances. Therefore the question is not whether choices 
made by individuals are either undertaken because of their personalized path dependence or emphasized due to 
embodied cognition (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). The question is what elements of the institutional framework are the 
source of specific and differentiated outcomes? 
  Are we driven by moral constraints or is our behavior dictated by set of external incentives? Do we aim to 
acquire the full information before any decision or are we eventually able to create institutions which enhance certain 
attitudes? 
 
3. Moral constraints and external incentives 
By moral constraints I define boundaries holding our decisions on maximizing our own utility function. These 
boundaries prevent our actions, because they could limit the chances of gains of other people. Therefore any rational 
decision is made upon pursuit of mutual benefits (Gauthier, 1986). The cooperative bargains set limits on predatory 
behavior and thus influence our attitude. Comparing the concept of moral constraints to the basic assumptions made 
by neoclassical economists, raises a dispute over the importance of morals. Rational man is self-interested and 
influenced by external constraints. What is called rational in the field of neoclassical economics is a self-interested 
homo economicus. By the pursuit of increasing the personal utility function the economic man strives to satisfy 
personal needs. “By the smallest quantity of labor and physical self-denial” an individual seeks to obtain his well-
being (Mill, 1884 (1997)). This view opposite to the view shared by both Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant and 
challenged by behavioral economics and new institutional economics is no longer a sufficient explanation for the 
differentiated outcomes.   
By external incentives I claim that not every individual behaves morally. A free-ride phenomenon indicates that 
rational decisions are a subject of an ambivalent attitude and not a common sense. However adjusting external 
constraints is a long-term process where legal framework is a product of evolved beliefs and norms transmitted among 
people (Hayek, 1979). To deal with uncertainty, we either avoid deciding on multi-layered and complex decisions or 
we seek to gain the full information concerning the subject of our concerns. By multi-layered and complex decisions 
160   Pawel Raja /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  172 ( 2015 )  157 – 160 
to be made I assume both long-term planning and unexpected calls for actions in everyday life. We rely on mutual 
trust, between agents to minimize time needed to acquire the full information. Therefore we become sure of other 
people common sense and their behavior consistent with the values and norms shared in the society. While we can 
divide the objections upon which our calculations are performed, the multi-attribute situations impact our rational 
thinking, as presented in the neoclassical economics. The challenge to transform and transmit the idea of tradeoffs as 
in the theory onto the factual situations is still a matter of research (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).  
 
4. Conclusions 
What is rational is an ambiguous concept. To behave rationally is to concern risks, profits and total outcomes of 
every decision made. The inability to possess the full information creates a degree of uncertainty. By experiencing 
lessening our cognitive abilities, we strive to establish benchmarks of what is just and acceptable and what is unfair 
and condemned.  Therefore we seek for rules coordinating our activities (Budzinski, 2001). Although institutions lead 
to specific models of behavior based on already expected outcomes, the interpretative character of any individual 
creates the subjectively analyzed situation. Both the incomplete information and non-rational decisions are a result of 
our subjective analysis. We reduce our transactional costs and trust in already existing patterns of behavior. We lessen 
our cognitive demands by following mental shared models. And we form constraints that “restrict the dimensions of 
[their] problem situations and thereby reduce the cognitive demands placed on individuals” (Lowenberg, 1990). 
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